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ESSAY 
Why Formalism? 
James E. Moliterno • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his recent book, Professor William Simon identifies and criticizes 
an analytical anomaly that he perceives in the jurisprudence of the law 
governing lawyers: the law governing lawyers, at least the traditional 
court application of the lawyer ethics codes, is far more oriented toward 
formalism and away from legal realism and its progeny than are other 
areas of the law .1 Simon's book argues effectively and persuasively why 
the law governing lawyers ought better to be analyzed as law is 
otherwise analyzed, in the traditions and through the methods of legal 
realism and its descendants that Simon calls a "contextual view of legal 
ethics."2 Simon understandably glides past any discussion of why the 
law governing lawyers may have come to be analyzed in this way. That 
point is not what his book is about. This Essay attempts to offer some 
modest insight into the "why formalism" question that in some respects 
may be lurking under Simon's themes. I suggest here three reasons why 
the law governing lawyers may have come to be analyzed in a more 
formalist way, eschewing legal realism, and express some hope that 
future analysis of the law governing lawyers will move to conformity 
with the rest of the law soon. 
Reading Simon's book did something quite good for me. It relieved 
a faint sense of ill-ease I have felt for a long time: I expect that I ought to 
be most comfortable in analyzing the law governing lawyers because that 
is primarily what I teach about, write about, and think about. But the 
truth is that I have always found it easier and more comfortable to 
analyze tort and contract and property and evidence law problems. 
Growing up in the law wrapped in legal realist and legal process thinking 
• Professor of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
I. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACfiCE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 3 
(1998). For further commentary on Simon's book, see·syrnposium, The Practice of Justice by 
William H. Simon, 51 STAN. L. REv. 867 (1999) and Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of 
Justice, 51 STAN. L. REv. 935 (1999). 
2. SIMON, supra note 1, at 10. In many ways the seeds of Simon's views are seen in William 
H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988). 
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(as our own students predominantly continue to do), working as a lawyer 
using legal realist analysis to do my job every day, and teaching law for 
fifteen or so years predominantly using legal realist and legal process 
analytical devices, I am naturally more comfortable around legal realist 
analysis than around formalism. Simon has now given me the very 
sensible explanation for why I am more at ease analyzing areas of the 
law about which I know only a little than I am analyzing the area of the 
law about which I know the most. 
I may not be alone in this among teachers and writers of the law 
governing lawyers. This phenomenon may explain why so many of us 
have been so drawn to the "other law" aspects of the law governing 
lawyers and especially the decade's expansion of the law governing 
lawyers from the profession's codes to a law governing lawyers 
approach, which includes within its reach an array of control 
mechanisms beyond bar discipline and reference to substantive law 
outside the bar codes.3 
II. REASONS FOR FORMALIST ORIENTATION 
A. In the Law Governing Lawyers, the Clients Are Lawyers 
Unlike strict formalism, legal realism imposes on clients the 
discomfort that flows from its relative lack of certainty.4 "[T]he logical 
method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is 
in every mind."5 Indeterminism is a part of realism's wake and is less 
comfortable and comforting for clients, at least in the context of 
predicting outcomes of consciously chosen actions.6 In particular, clients 
3. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 799 (1992). See 
generally Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 355 (1996) (discussing regulation of fedeml prosecutors); Ted Schneyer, Profession Discipline 
for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. I (1991) (discussing professional discipline in law firms). 
4. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 146-58 (tent. ed. 1994); 
see also Stephen MeG. Bundy & Einar Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 MICH. L. 
REv. 261, 265 (1993) (discussing inevitable impreciseness even in an optimal sanctioning regime); 
David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv. 468, 511-13 (1990) (noting the 
range of credible inteJ1'relations that legal realism provides for lawyers). 
5. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897), 
reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REv. 991, 998 (1997). 
6. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 4, at 271 n.25, 272 n.29 (discussing the benefits of 
"bright-line" rules based on "easily observable features of the parties' conduct."); John E. Calfee & 
Richard Cmswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 
965, 966 (1984) (arguing that uncertain laws lead to less socially desirable behavior); Isaac Ehrlich 
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257 
(1974) (noting the benefits which would result from more precise legal standards). See generally 
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planning future action with the help of a lawyer prefer to be told that 
actions produce predictable and certain results.7 Who would not prefer 
certainty when planning? Legal realism oriented analysis deprives 
clients, as it must, of the level of predictability that they might prefer in 
favor of its counterbalance, flexibility.8 Lawyers say to clients (because 
we tell our students they must and they go off and become lawyers): "It 
is most likely that your actions will produce X result, but I cannot be 
certain of what a judge or jury might do if the matter is litigated. There 
are reasonable arguments that cut the other way."9 
Lawyers are professionals who assist clients in evaluating the legal 
implications of consciously chosen courses of action. We might 
reasonably expect most lawyers' conduct to be the result of their own 
evaluation of the legal implications of a consciously chosen course of 
action. 
The law governing lawyers is about lawyer relationships with 
clients, other lawyers, the justice system, and the public. Because t~e 
law governing lawyers is about lawyers' relationships, in the law of 
lawyering, as in no other area of the law, lawyers systematically are 
clients. In other words, while in the usual course of their practice, 
lawyers experience the effects of contract, tort, and property law 
vicariously as experts through the direct experiences of their clients, in 
the application of the law governing lawyers, the lawyers are the 
clients.10 The law operates directly on the lawyers, their actions, and 
their relationships. The legal profession, at least in the context of the 
application of the bar ethics codes, is self-governing. Lawyers decide on 
the system of analysis that will be used when the law governing lawyers 
is applied to a lawyer's conduct. If planning clients would be more 
comfortable with the predictability of formalism than the uncertainty of 
realism, and if in the law governing lawyers, the clients are lawyers with 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About 
How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 V AND. L. REv. 395 (1950) (classic fun-poking at 
indeterminism). 
7. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 6, at 263-72. 
8. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 146-58. 
9. We do say this sort of thing to our students and they do go off and so advise their clients. 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey, Historical & Critical Introduction to HENRY M. HART 
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS, at li-Iii (1994) (discussing the incredible influence on 
generations of lawyers of the Hart & Sacks materials). 
10. See James E. Molitemo, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing Lost 
Benefits of the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 83,98 (1991). 
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the power to determine what system of analysis will apply, it should be 
unsurprising if the system chosen is the comfortable one, formalism. 1 1 
B. Absence of Redeeming Policy 
There are legitimate policies underlying the bar ethics enforcement 
system, to be sure. Courts typically discuss the protection of the public 
from incompetent and dishonest lawyers and the maintenance of public 
confidence in the system of laws and justice. 12 Less frequently, a judge 
will also acknowledge a punishment policy in the application of the bar 
ethics rules. 13 But the mix of the profession's self-interest and the 
influence of early twentieth century bar leaders, 14 concerned in part about 
their clients' interests, 15 in the rationales underlying many of the bar 
ethics rules makes the use of legal realist, policy-oriented, social-result-
oriented analysis both tricky and embarrassing-and, therefore, I 
suggest, less done. 
Although Simon focuses his attention mostly on the formalist 
approach to defming "the bounds of the law"16 and on the defining 
themes of the lawyer-client relationship, the same sort of formalism he 
describes applies in many other bar and court applications of bar ethics 
rules. Take the rule concerning loaning clients money during litigation.'' 
In Committee on Professional Ethics v. Bitter,18 the lawyer was 
disciplined in part for loaning his impecunious clients $986.70 interest-
II. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv. 468, 511-13 
( 1990). See generally Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 4. 
12. Cf ABA JOINT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, STANDARDS FOR LAWYER 
DISCIPLINARY AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS§ 1.1 (Tentative Draft 1978). The Standards state: 
/d. 
The purpose of lawyer discipline and disability proceedings is to maintain appropriate 
standards of professional conduct in order to protect the public and the administration of 
justice from lawyers who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or are 
likely to be unable to properly discharge their professional duties. 
13. E.g.,ln re Rosellini, 646 P.2d 122, 126-27 (Wash. 1982) (Dolliver, J., dissenting). 
14. See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
IN MODERN AMERICA 4-6 (1976) (discussing the stratification of the legal profession); see also Max 
Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REv. 48, 66, 71 (1935) (analyzing the profession's 
attitude towards lawyer-client financial arrangements). 
IS. See, e.g., In re Sizer, 267 S.W. 922, 925 (Mo. 1924) (en bane) (dismissing disciplinary 
action against personal injury lawyer following bar investigation of their client-getting activities 
underwritten by a consortium of railroad lawyers). 
16. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980). 
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (1998); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-l 03 (1980). 
18. 279 N.W.2d 521 (Iowa 1979). 
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free for humanitarian reasons. 19 This conduct violated Disciplinary Rule 
(DR) 5-103(A).20 The violated rule is based in part on conflict of interest 
grounds and in part on the common law crimes and torts of champerty, 
barratry, and maintenance (in this instance, especially maintenance)?' 
Bitter's conduct violated the plain meaning of the rules language.22 And 
that is how carefully the court treated the issue-formalism at its best (or 
worst, depending on ones perspective on the value of formalism). The 
language of the rule does not require that Bitter have taken unfair 
advantage of his clients; thus, his motives and the good that his actions 
may have actually produced for his clients are irrelevant.23 Even if 
Bitter's actions produced justice by, for example, allowing his clients to 
withstand delaying tactics or low-ball settlement offers and therefore stay 
in the litigation to a judgment based on the merits, Bitter's conduct 
would have violated the legal ethics rule and subjected him to discipline. 
Never mind that other conflicts of similar danger and magnitude allow 
for client waiver;24 this rule's language does not permit waiver, so 
Bitter's clients' probable waiver or consent is irrelevant.25 Never mind 
that similar conduct in the absence of litigation, say during a client's 
patent application process, but not during a patent infringement suit, 
would be permitted. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, in an admirable show of candor, acknowledges that this rule 
distinguishes between litigation and non-litigation settings for "largely 
historical" reasons?6 Never mind that the actions and crimes for cham-
perty, barratry, and maintenance (the historical antecedents to the ethics 
19. Jd. at 523. 
20. ld. (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 5-l 03(A) (1980)). 
21. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 48 cmt. b. (Proposed Final 
Draft No. I, 1996); ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 121 (3d ed. 
1996). 
/d. 
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (1998). Model Rule 1.8(e) provides: 
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or 
contemplated litigation, except that: 
(I) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which 
may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and (2) a lawyer representing an 
indigent client may pay court costs and expenses oflitigation on behalf of the client. 
23. See generally Radin, supra note 14, at 72 (referring to the good that sometimes results 
from lawyer acts of champerty and maintenance). 
24. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1:7 (1998); see also l..avaja v. Carter, 505 
N.E.2d 694, 699-700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (allowing representation of multiple parties who were 
informed and consented). 
25. The ethics rule is as much about restraints on client-getting activities as it is about 
conflicts of interest between lawyer and client. 
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 48 cmt. b. (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1, 1996). 
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rule) all required a malice element;27 the language of this rule does not, 
so Bitter's good motivation and the absence of any showing of malice 
toward his clients' litigation opponents are irrelevant. How far would we 
get if we had to make policy-based arguments in applying Model Rule 
1.8(e) to Bitter's conduct? In part, at least, we would find ourselves 
analyzing what result would best serve the original drafters' (here I mean 
the drafters of the Canons) intent to restrain the bringing of personal 
injury claims by those unable to withstand the delay of litigation against 
the drafters' corporate clients.28 What better reason to use a formalist 
approach than the inclination to avoid dealing with awkward and 
embarrassing policy discussions? 
Imagine the discussion of "legislative history" or historical context 
in a legal realist style opinion applying some of the bar ethics rules when 
the drafters' intent was to exclude outsiders from the profession or 
diminish their ability to attract and serve clients. Setting higher 
educational standards for admission to the bar was one means chosen to 
keep the unwanted out of the profession, to "purify the stream at its 
source," as one ABA committee put it.29 Take a case like In re 
Lammers.30 Mr. Lammers had taken and passed the Ohio bar exam after 
having completed all requirements for his J.D., save the submission of a 
seminar paper. After passing the bar exam, he practiced law successfully 
for seven years, earning praise from colleagues and clients alike. When 
the educational infirmity came to light, the bar moved against his license, 
and the Ohio Supreme Court revoked his law license.31 When evaluating 
the rationale for disbarring Lammers, should the court have considered 
whether one result or the other in the case would further the interest in 
excluding ethnic, racial, and religious minorities from the practice of law 
as expressed by the original creators of the policies underlying the 
educational requirements? What if it had? 
A court that got as close as any to such candid policy analysis in the 
context of client-getting and financial assistance was the Missouri 
27. See Radin, supra note 14, at 67. 
28. Some states have amended their versions of Model Rule 1.8(e) to ameliorate this impact 
of the rule. See, e.g., MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e), reprinted in 52 MINN. STAT. 
ANN. (West 1993); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.08(d), reprinted in TEX. 
GOVT CODE ANN. tit. 2 app. A (Vernon 1998). 
29. Proceedings of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 46 A.B.A. REP. 
656, 681 (1921 ). For more on the bar's interest in raising educational standards to exclude unwanted 
ethnic and racial groups from bar membership, see AUERBACH, supra note 14, at 113. 
30. 581 N.E.2d 1359(0hio 1991). 
3 I. /d. at 1361. 
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Supreme Court in In re Sizer.32 In Sizer, the court reviewed a petition to 
disbar two personal injury plaintiffs' lawyers for soliciting clients and, in 
particular, for offering, and in some cases providing, financial assistance 
to their clients during litigation.33 Although the disciplinary matter was 
brought (as procedure required it to be) in the name of the bar 
association, the facts were investigated, the charges were encouraged, 
and the litigation was fmanced by a consortium of corporate interests and 
their lawyers.34 In language rare in court opinions reviewing bar dis-
cipline, the court considered the context of the matter before it, even as it 
insisted that the context should not alter its judgment: 
Let us speak plainly, as courts should speak, and say that every earmark of the 
evidence in this case shows that it is an effort by corporation lawyers as 
against what they call damage suit lawyers. All this (true as it may be, and as 
we think it is) does not change this case. The motive for preferring the charges 
is of small consequence, if, in fact, the charges are sufficient in law, and the 
respondents are guilty .... [Nonetheless] [i]f the Bar Associations, sua sponte, 
had preferred the charges, we would have one background, but where the 
corporation lawyers of the [bar] associations have induced the associations to 
act upon evidence procured by [their investigator], the background is 
different. Js 
The Sizer court considered the nature of the "damage-lawyers'" 
client's injuries, the economic hardships being suffered by their families, 
and the settlement tactics undertaken by defendants in determining to 
dismiss the disciplinary charges against Sizer.36 The almost jarring 
nature of the court's candor evidences its inconsistency with the norm in 
bar discipline cases and the usual absence of discussion of context. 
Doing legal realist analysis of the application of a legal rule requires 
examination of the policies that drive the rule, in part by examination of 
the rationales that animated the rule's makers. When those policies are 
embarrassing, or worse, the temptation is strong to confine the analysis 
to a more formalist approach. Particularly where the drafters are from 
the legal profession and the rule's interpreter, a bar association or court, 
is also part of the legal profession, the push will be overwhelmingly 
toward formalism and away from any analysis that requires examination 
of the embarrassing policies for the rules. 
32. 267 S.W. 922 (Mo. 1924). 
33. ld. at 925. 
34. /d. at 923. 
35. ld. at 924-25. 
36. ld. at 925-34. 
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C. Courts, as Insiders to Self-Regulation, Desire to Avoid Appearing to 
Be Creative with the Application of Rules 
The system for applying the bar rules to lawyer conduct is, of 
course, a system of self-regulation. Courts and bar authorities, the arbit-
ers of the rules' application, are insiders in that system. Much is made, 
in the effort to preserve the self-regulation system itself, of the need for 
public confidence in the policing of lawyer conduct, and of avoidance of 
the appearance of impropriety. 
Legal realism, with its more flexible approach to interpreting and 
applying rule language, has the potential for creating an appearance of 
judicial maneuvering and manipulation. Maintaining public confidence 
in the system of laws and justice, and in the profession's ability to self-
govern as an independent value, pushes toward formal, literal application 
of rules. Courts place value on the avoidance of this appearance and are 
· pushed by this concern toward fonnalism: apply the plain language of 
the rule without regard to policy arguments that might suggest an 
application less apparent on the face of the rule. 
Particularly as insiders to the system of self-regulation, courts (and, 
to an even greater extent, bar authorities), which value public confidence 
in the justice system and want to protect the profession's powerful 
interest in self-regulation, will be inclined strongly toward formal 
applications of rules to avoid an appearance of favoritism toward either 
the regulated lawyer or the organized bar as complainant. Such 
inclination finds expression in the appearance of impropriety notion, the 
application of which sometimes leads courts and bar authorities to 
discipline lawyers for conduct which, while not inappropriate, might 
appear so. When courts note the need to protect the public's "perception 
of the independence and integrity of the legal profession,"37 or hold 
representation is impermissible when "an ordinary knowledgeable citizen 
acquainted with the facts would conclude that the . . . representation 
poses a substantial risk of disservice to either the public interest or the 
interest of one of the clients,"38 they are expressing the system's concern 
for maintaining its independence from outside regulation. That interest, 
focused on ensuring that even appropriate conduct that may appear 
37. In reNo. 653 of the Advisory Comm. on Prof] Ethics, 623 A.2d 241, 245 (N.J. 1993) 
(quoting In reNo. 415 of the Advisory Comm. on Prort Ethics, 407 A.2d 1197 (N.J. 1979)). 
38. In reNo. 58-91(8) of the Advisory Comm. on Prof! Ethics, 616 A.2d 1290, 1291 (N.J. 
1992) (quoting Rule 1.7(cX2) of New Jersey's Rules of Professional Conduct). 
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inappropriate to non-lawyers is policed, naturally tends courts toward 
avoidance oflegal realism's indeterminism. 
Ill. HOPE 
Maintaining a firm formalist foot in the mud creates impediments to 
the sensible development of a jurisprudence of the law governing 
lawyers. But there is hope and there are sure signs that this problem is 
diminishing. 
The law governing lawyers is moving toward an analytical approach 
more consistent with other areas of law, and in the process a more 
constructive jurisprudence, because the days when most of the law 
governing lawyers was based on the application of bar rules by bar 
authorities reviewed by courts are largely behind us. In most realms, 
malpractice, motions to disqualify, Rule 11, and so on are far more 
effective molders of lawyer conduce9 and have become, and are 
becoming, a much more significant part of the law governing lawyers. 
Of course, the bar rules continue to play a critical role in these other 
control mechanisms. However, when the bar rules are applied outside 
the bar discipline process in litigation and other forums, courts use a very 
different analytical model,40 far more in the legal realist spirit. This 
different analytical model is sensitive to a far wider range of policy 
arguments than that used in bar disciplinary enforcement. Courts 
applying the conflict of interest rules in disqualification motion settings 
(certainly the setting that counts most today) account for policies relating 
to judicial economy, equity interests of the moving party's conduct, 
autonomy of choice of lawyer by clients, and so on.41 When lawyers are 
found liable for complicity in client misconduct, legal realist analysis, 
not formalism, is used.42 When courts control fee setting, legal realist 
analysis, not formalism, is used.43 And when courts consider dismissing 
39. Wilkins, supra note 3, at 802-03. 
40. See, e.g., Neisig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (N.Y. 1990) (stating that disciplinary 
rules are broad guidelines not rigid rules requiring strict adherence). 
41. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433,444-46 (2d Cir. 1980) (denying a motion 
to disqualify an attorney in a securities law case where he had previously worked for the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) because it did not threaten to taint the trial), vacated and 
remanded by McAlpin v. Armstrong, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981) (mem.) (vacating court's holding that 
disqualification motions can not be appealed); Steams v. Navigant Consulting, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 2d 
1014, 1016 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (denying a motion to disqualify a law firm that had violated the letter but 
not the spirit of ethical rules). 
42. See, e.g., Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330, 1349-51 (N.D. Ga. 1983) {applying 
SEC liability to lawyer conduct). 
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criminal complaints based on prosecutor violation of bar ethics rules, 
legal realism, not formalism, is used.44 
It may even be that the formalist approach to analyzing bar ethics 
rules is already more the exception than the rule. If lawyers are more 
influenced in their actions by control mechanisms other than bar 
discipline, as must surely be the case in many contexts, then lawyers may 
behave less in a way that contemplates a formalist analytical mode in 
their lawyer-client relationships than Simon suggests. 
As time passes, more and more of the law governing lawyers will be 
about mechanisms beyond bar enforcement, and more and more will 
accordingly be subject to realist analysis rather than the formalist 
approach that Simon notices and argues against--eventually resulting, if 
it has not already, in less lawyer behavior that is formalist referenced and 
more that is contextual or legal realist referenced. 
43. See, e.g., Pfeifer v. Sentry Ins., 745 F. Supp. 1434, 1443 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (discussing 
court regulation offee award). 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that trial 
court erred in dismissing charges against defendant based on prosecutor's violation of Model Rule 
4.2); United States v. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 660 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that court cannot 
exclude evidence obtained in violation of ethics rule), rev'd on other grounds, 101 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 
1983). 
